Editing Philosophical Investigations (section)

=== From Picture to Practice: ''Investigations'' as an Autistic Operating System for Language ===
Wittgenstein’s ''Philosophical Investigations'' is best read not as a loose scrapbook of observations but as a '''cognitive artifact''': a system he engineered to regulate how language is used, tested, and repaired in real time. Externally it is a book of ''Bemerkungen'' (“remarks”) published posthumously in 1953 and arranged in two parts. Internally it is a toolset — a rule‑based ''operating system'' for ordinary talk — designed by a mind that insists on '''function, purpose, and consequences''' over intuition or rhetoric (TotalAsperger traits: hyper‑systemizing, tool‑mindset, rule‑following, closure logic). The Preface itself frames the book “in contrast with and against the background of [his] older way of thinking,” a signal that readers must recalibrate from the ''Tractatus''’s ideal calculus to lived language.

The shift is real but '''not''' a departure from autistic cognition; it is its '''extension'''. New Nachlass‑based work shows a continuous thread from the early project to the later: '''meaning as use''', consequences of terms, and language as ''calculus''(de Queiroz documents the continuity in notes and manuscripts, e.g., explicit appeals to “operating with the word” and to a “calculus/system of propositions”) — “in his speaking of language as a ‘calculus’.” (de Queiroz 2023) [Primary/Nachlass]. A late note (MS 107) asks: “Can one say: ''the sense of a sentence is its purpose?'' [Or a word ‘''its meaning is its purpose''’]” (de Queiroz 2023) [Primary/Nachlass]. These are not social‑turn slogans; they’re '''functional specifications'''.

Wittgenstein’s famed “language‑games” (introduced early and elaborated at §23) make the point concrete: ''speaking is part of an activity, or of a life‑form''; the same utterance (“Water!”) can be an order, warning, or report depending on the game

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. In place of a grand theory, he installs '''practical rule‑kits''' and '''tests'''. The book’s philosophical ambition is therapeutic — “to show the fly the way out of the fly‑bottle” (§309)

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— but its method is '''engineering''': locate the fault (a misuse), isolate it (via a mini‑game), test it (by varying the use), and retire the illusion (closure).

'''Primary citations''' (two minimum): (i) “''the meaning of a word is its use in the language''” (§43)

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<nowiki>;</nowiki> (ii) “''An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria''” (§580)

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.

'''Nachlass''': (i) “in his speaking of language as a ‘calculus’.” (de Queiroz 2023) [P]; (ii) “its meaning is its purpose.” (MS 107; de Queiroz 2023) [P].

'''Trait justification:''' Hyper‑systemizing and tool‑thinking drive the functionalization of meaning (“purpose,” “use”), while closure logic underwrites the therapeutic endgame (stop when the rule‑confusion dissolves).
----== I. The Form of ''Investigations'' — Remarks, Scripts, and Executive Control ==

'''Claim.''' The ''Investigations'' is architected as '''scripts of use''' rather than chapters of doctrine. The §‑numbered remarks, mini‑dialogues, abrupt restarts, and perpetual “return to cases” encode autistic '''executive strategies''': chunking, restarting, and working by local invariants.

'''Evidence (primary & secondary).''' The work “is divided into two parts” of remarks

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rather than a linear treatise; Wittgenstein himself says the new book is to be seen “against the background” of his older way

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. Fitzgerald — explicitly analyzing the Preface and the later style — characterizes the form plainly: “'''It was an autistic style — a kind of one‑person psychology.'''” (Fitzgerald, ''Autism and Creativity'', ch. 4) [S]. He further notes that “the remarks [sometimes] '''jumped suddenly from subject to subject''',” and that the ''insistence on at least surface disconnectedness'' applies here as well; without numbering the ''Tractatus'' “would have been unintelligible”; for the ''later'' work the scripts '''are''' the structure (Fitzgerald, ch. 4) [S].

'''Interpretation (TotalAutismo).'''

* '''Monotropism & chunking.''' The §‑design enforces '''local focus'''. Each remark is a self‑contained test bench. When a use‑illusion appears, Wittgenstein spins up a small “game,” pressures it, then terminates.
* '''Scripting.''' Recurring “builder’s language,” “slab!”, and exchange‑patterns function like '''interaction macros''': fixed forms reused across contexts; that is textbook autistic scripting repurposed as method.
* '''Executive control via reset.''' The constant '''restarts''' (‘Let’s look at it like this’, ‘Consider another case’) enact an executive “reset” to keep confusions from snowballing.

'''Primary citations.''' (i) Preface contrast to earlier work

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<nowiki>;</nowiki> (ii) “remarks” format named in the Preface

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.

'''Secondary/Nachlass.''' Fitzgerald on “autistic style” [S]; de Queiroz on persistent '''calculus/game''' paradigm throughout the Nachlass (de Queiroz 2023) [P].

'''Trait justification.''' The form is a ''behavioral accommodation'': chunked, scripted, restart‑capable — '''autistic scaffolding'''for clarity under load.
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